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I. INTRODUCTION
Employers consider many factors when selecting among
candidates for employment. Often employers conduct only a brief
review of candidates, sometimes after more extensive evaluation. But
they always assess candidates on limited information, evaluating them
for apparent skills, ability, competence, personality traits,
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appearance, and past employment history, among other things. The
evaluation generally aims to determine whether a particular
candidate presents either a good prospect for success or an
unacceptable risk to the employer’s interests and the security and
safety of customers, employees, and the public. Evidence that the
applicant has a history of criminal misconduct that he might repeat
1
while employed is one factor that employers often consider.
There are solid business reasons to consider this history.
Criminological studies demonstrate that nothing predicts future
criminal activity more accurately than a history of past criminal
2
activity. An employer’s concern about loss of business assets or
danger to persons exposed to its employees is well justified. Failure
to identify and assess possible risks may expose the business to
ruinous theft or result in serious harm to others. The question
examined in this Article is whether an employer’s consideration of
criminal history should be subject to challenge through claims of
racially discriminatory impact under the civil rights laws even though
the employer uniformly considers the criminal history of all
applicants and applies its judgments similarly among protected
groups. This is a timely issue. The United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC or “the Commission”) and the
Departments of Labor and Justice have taken the position that using
criminal history as a selection standard has a disparate impact on
3
African Americans and Hispanics. To avoid liability, an employer
1

Current reports indicate that roughly fifty percent of employers either always
or sometimes perform some kind of review for past convictions. Harry J. Holzer,
Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks,
and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 454 (2006). The
choice of the masculine pronoun is intentional to reflect the perception that males
are more commonly affected by such investigations. Accord Complaint, EEOC v.
Freeman, No. 8:09-CV-02573 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2009) (claiming that screening for
criminal convictions discriminates against men, who are disproportionately overrepresented in criminal convictions).
2
See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 263 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 10, 12–13 (2009)
(contrasting those first arrested at sixteen with those first arrested at eighteen)
[hereinafter “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal Background Checks]; Shawn
D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal
Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49
CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28, 43 (2011); see also ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & KIMINORI NAKAMURA,
FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENSION OF CURRENT
ESTIMATES OF REDEMPTION TIMES: ROBUSTNESS TESTING, OUT-OF-STATE ARRESTS, AND
RADICAL DIFFERENCES 23 n.21 (2012) (“Prior criminal history is an important
predictor of recidivism and is associated with a higher risk of recidivism.”).
3
AMY SOLOMON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BRIEFING ON THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS AND THE EEOC’S CONVICTION RECORDS POLICY ON THE
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may have to prove the “business necessity” for applying this standard
4
to those applicants under the antidiscrimination laws.
This Article explores the government’s application of the
disparate impact theory of discrimination to employment decisions
that turn on an applicant’s conviction for certain crimes. Part II
surveys the common law principle that holds employers liable for
injuries to others where they have been negligent in failing to
investigate or, having investigated, failing to take actions sufficient to
the discharge of a common law duty of care to those others.
Part III reviews the development of the disparate impact theory
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and as
applied to facially neutral standards for employment selection that
tend to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. In addition,
Part III examines the cases involving challenges to the use of criminal
convictions as a standard for selection that have been decided under
the disparate impact theory.
In Part IV, this Article reviews recent guidance from the EEOC
5
to its field offices that would apply generalized national
incarceration rates to support findings of discrimination anywhere
that an employer rejects an African American or Hispanic candidate
for having committed crimes that are disclosed or discovered during
the application process.
Part V argues that this agency policy sweeps too broadly
because, in its rush to require employers to prove the “necessity” of
their standards, it fails to consider the differences in the labor market
6
as well as in the relevant standards for evaluation of “necessity.”
Moreover, the policy may require too much under the judicially
accepted standards for these cases decided under a disparate impact
EMPLOYMENT OF BLACK AND HISPANIC WORKERS 2 (2012); Training and Employment
Guidance Letter No. 31-11, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (May 25, 2012), available at
http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/TEGL/TEGL_31_11_acc.pdf.
Under
current law, a practice is permissible if it is “job related . . . and consistent with
business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). As this Article will show, this has
been held to be a lesser standard than “necessity” as commonly understood. See, e.g.,
Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 593 (D.R.I.
1996), aff’d, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997).
4
Donnelly, 110 F.3d at 2.
5
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002 (2012), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf. Although the
Guidance does not address gender, the EEOC has nonetheless filed suit on the basis
of the alleged disparate impact that background checks have on male employees.
Complaint at 4, EEOC v. Freeman, No. 8:09-CV-02573 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2009).
6
“Necessity” is in quotes to denote that it is a term of art in this context. As will
become clear, the standard Congress has adopted is, in part, well short of actual
necessity.
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theory.
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING
Like every other person and entity, an employer has a common
7
law duty of care to prevent foreseeable harm to others. In the
employment context, the Restatement of the Law of Torts describes
that duty as follows:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to
control his servant while acting outside the scope of his
employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming
others or from so conducting himself as to create an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the
master or upon which the servant is privileged to
enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
8
opportunity for exercising such control.
That duty is nowhere more chillingly illustrated than in the
9
Florida case of Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison. As described in
that opinion, John Allen Turner did odd jobs for Tallahassee
10
Furniture for several months. He had a history of violent assaultive
behavior, including an incident in which he stabbed his wife in the
11
face. He had been using heroin and cocaine with coworkers during
12
this time and had violated his probation from an earlier conviction.
13
The company hired Turner for an open delivery driver position. It
made no inquiry into Turner’s publicly available criminal conviction
history, however, and did not even require him to fill out an
application for employment that would have called for identification
14
of that history.
7

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DUTY OF MASTER
SERVANT § 317 (1965).
9
583 So.2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
10
Id. at 748.
11
Id. at 749.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 748.
14
Id.
8

TO

CONTROL CONDUCT

OF
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15

Elizabeth Harrison was a student at Florida State University.
She purchased a couch from Tallahassee Furniture and Turner was
16
in the crew that delivered it to her apartment. He also helped by
17
moving furniture around for her during the delivery. Apparently in
appreciation, Harrison gave him a television set that she no longer
18
19
wanted. Turner accepted the gift and took it away with him.
Weeks later, on New Year’s Day, Turner returned to Harrison’s
apartment, claiming that the company required him to produce a
20
receipt for the television.
She left the door ajar and began to
21
Meanwhile, he asked to use her
prepare a receipt for him.
22
Turner then entered the apartment,
bathroom and she agreed.
took a knife from her kitchen, and brutally assaulted Harrison,
23
causing her serious and permanent injuries.
Harrison sued Tallahassee Furniture for negligent hiring and
obtained a verdict of almost $2 million in compensatory and punitive
24
damages that the company appealed. In an extensive discussion of
the evidence and the common law of negligent hiring, the appellate
25
court upheld the verdict in full. The court relied in part on expert
testimony about security and criminological issues that indicated that
a history of misconduct that was available for review at the time of
Turner’s hiring should and would have alerted the company that
hiring Turner presented a risk to the company’s customers, including
26
Harrison.
27
Similar cases abound across the United States.
15

Harrison, 583 So.2d at 748.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Harrison, 583 So.2d at 748.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 747, 748.
24
Id. at 748.
25
Id. at 750–63.
26
Id. at 759–63,
27
See, e.g., Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 628–30 (4th Cir. 2004)
(vacating summary judgment for employer on plaintiff’s claims of negligent hiring
and negligent retention because employer failed to conduct a criminal background
check of employee, and therefore, a question of fact remained concerning whether
employer should have known of employee’s past violent conduct); Beverly v.
Diamond Transp. Servs., Inc., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 11136, at *1–3 (4th Cir. June 1,
1999) (affirming jury’s $3 million award to rape victim after finding that
transportation service was negligent in hiring a convicted felon without conducting a
background check; employee driver who raped victim had past convictions for
16
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Criminology experts report that a significant predictor of future
criminal behavior is a record of past behavior, particularly in
combination with a person’s age at the time of conviction as well as
28
his age at subsequent release from incarceration. Given both the
ready availability of Internet sources and increasingly available
resources for prospective employers to make inquiry, it seems clear
that failure to discover the criminal history of someone like Turner
presents a question for a jury in a negligence case: whether the
employer discharged its duty of care to the customer, members of the
public, or other employees when it failed to check or, having
29
checked, disregarded the predictive value of the record.
Considered either from the perspective of affirmative duty or as a
matter of risk prevention, these cases drive many employers to make a
conspiracy to commit robbery, felony robbery, possession of marijuana, reckless
driving, and concealment of a firearm); Becken v. Manpower, Inc., 532 F.2d 56, 57
(7th Cir. 1976) (finding that a question of fact existed as to whether employment
agency was negligent in hiring employee who stole from client when the employment
agency failed to conduct background checks on employees who were paroled
felons); C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424, 427–28 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (reversing dismissal of employer negligence claims where the allegations in
the complaint averred, inter alia, that the defendant employer failed to conduct a
background check, which would have revealed employee’s sex crime history); Evan F.
v. Hughson United Methodist Church, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 748, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(“[A]n employer can be held liable for negligent hiring if he knows the employee is
unfit, or has reason to believe the employee is unfit or fails to use reasonable care to
discover the employee’s unfitness before hiring him.”); TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v.
Jennings, 590 S.E.2d 807, 807–08 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming jury verdict of
negligence where the employer did not conduct a background check); Harrington v.
La. State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 714 So. 2d 845, 847–48 (La. Ct.
App. 1998) (finding the school board liable for negligent hiring where it failed to
conduct a background check on a professor, who ultimately raped a female student,
which would have revealed that the professor had prior convictions and served jail
time for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, theft, and interstate
transportation of forged securities); Hines v. Aandahl Constr. Co., LLC, 2006 Minn.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 1033, at *1–2 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006) (affirming lower
court’s holding that a contractor was negligent in hiring a painter whose employees
robbed and assaulted the homeowners; the contractor knew that the painter had
three prior felony convictions for burglary, was a drug addict, and had admitted to
theft from another homeowner, but failed to conduct a background check and
assigned painter to jobs that gave him access to private residences); Lingar v. Live-In
Companions, Inc., 692 A.2d 61, 62–63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (finding a
genuine issue of fact as to plaintiffs’ claims for negligent hiring against home health
care company whose employee stole from disabled patient and abandoned him;
employer failed to conduct background check on employee who lied about prior
convictions, which included possession and distribution of cocaine, shoplifting,
trespassing, and receipt of stolen property); Rucshner v. ADT Sec. Sys., Inc., 204 P.3d
271, 275–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (absence of employer background check could in
form jury verdict for victim that failure caused injury to victim).
28
See supra note 2.
29
See Harrison, 583 So.2d at 740; see cases cited supra note 27.
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careful search before hiring.
The same issues apply for an employer that is concerned about
avoiding risk of theft or misappropriation from the business or from
customers. An employer has a legitimate interest in avoiding future
harm to itself and its customers from dishonesty, theft, and fraud.
The employer takes an unnecessary risk if no inquiry precedes the
hiring of an individual who has a record of misconduct in the past. It
has been reported that companies lose about $52 billion a year to
31
employee theft, and it cannot be denied that inquiring into
potential employees’ criminal histories, thereby avoiding harm to
customers and loss to the employer, addresses legitimate business
interests for employers.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII
32

Cases like Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., in which
plaintiffs bring suits against employers for considering criminal
records in employment decisions, arise under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 or parallel state laws. In 1964, Congress enacted
33
Title VII to prevent certain types of discrimination in the workplace.
Although it swept more broadly, there is no doubt that the principal
focus of the Act was to correct the history of overt racial
34
discrimination in the United States. Title VII declares that “[i]t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
35
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” This
language clearly prohibits disparate treatment of persons because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, but in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., the Supreme Court ultimately found that Title VII
prohibits not just policies that have the “purpose” but also those that
30

See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at III.B; Holzer,
Raphael & Stoll, supra note 1, at 451; see also Harry J. Holzer, Statement before
United States Commission on Civil Rights at n.2 (Dec. 7, 2012) (“Employers tend to
fear legal liability for theft or bodily harm done to coworkers or customers by
previous offenders in a small number of well-known cases.”).
31
Larry Reynolds, Pay Policies Can Prevent Employee Theft, Fraud, Studies Show,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.bna.com/pay-policies-preventn17179871204/.
32
549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977).
33
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2, 28 & 42 U.S.C.).
34
H.R. 914, 88th Cong. (1963).
35
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
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have the “effect” of discriminating against any of these demographic
36
classes.
In Griggs, the Court confirmed that Title VII prohibited practices
or policies that, although facially neutral, had a disparate impact by
37
race, or other protected classes, and were not job related.
The
Court considered section 703(h) of Title VII, which prohibits the use
of ability tests where they are “designed, intended or used to
38
discriminate[.]” It seized upon the words “used to discriminate”
and, although it did not conduct a textual analysis, it inferred that
the phrase “used to” denotes a lesser standard than does “designed”
39
or “intended.” The Court then focused on the legislative history of
the statute, particularly the defeat of Senator John Tower’s proposed
amendment that would have explicitly authorized “professionally
40
developed ability tests.”
Even though reliance on rejected
41
amendments is a disfavored means of statutory interpretation, the
Court nevertheless used that rejection to hold that Congress
intended to forbid the use of ability tests, at least those that
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination “unless they are
42
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.” Over the
years, Griggs’ applicability expanded beyond ability tests and
educational requirements to include any employment policy that has
43
a disparate impact upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The Supreme Court inferred Congress’s intent to address
unintentional discrimination in 1971 with its decision in Griggs.
44
Congress eventually codified this approach in 1991. Title VII now
provides that it is unlawful for an employer to “use[] a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin [if] the respondent fails
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
45
position in question and consistent with business necessity[.]” As

36

401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
Id.
38
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(h); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433.
39
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433–34 (emphasis in original).
40
Id. at 435.
41
Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1844).
42
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
43
See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (discussing gender
discrimination where a prison guard was rejected for failure to meet weight
requirements).
44
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)).
45
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
37
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part of a political compromise, however, Congress also agreed not to
define the phrase “job related . . . and consistent with business
46
necessity” with any more clarity or precision. Congress thus left that
definition to the courts to develop case-by-case.
A. The Birth of Disparate Impact Theory
Originally, the EEOC conceived of disparate impact theory as a
47
“potential alternative approach” to the standard discrimination case.
The EEOC’s decision was strategic—EEOC wanted employers to work
with the Agency, and knew that achieving employer compliance
would be easier if, instead of stigmatizing employers by requiring a
showing of intentional discrimination, it focused on issues that
48
employers were less likely to resist. The theory was that progress in
addressing headwinds to equal opportunity was more important than
49
assignment of motives that might attract more vigorous resistance.
Griggs was not the first case in which a federal court approved of
disparate impact theory. One of the first cases to hold in favor of a
plaintiff on a disparate impact claim was a case involving an
50
employer’s refusal to hire an applicant because of his arrest record.
In that case, however, as was typical of the pre-Griggs disparate impact
51
cases, the court was concerned about the likelihood that the
employer had intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
52
because of his race and the analysis proceeded on that hypothesis.
46

See, e.g., Donnelly, 929 F. Supp. at 593, aff’d, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997).
Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
715 (2006).
48
Id. at 715–16.
49
Id. at 716.
50
See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970), modified,
472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972). In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., an employer revoked a
job offer to a black man who “had previously been arrested on fourteen different
occasions in situations other than minor traffic incidents,” but who “had never been
convicted of any criminal offense.” Id. at 402. The court held in favor of the plaintiff
because “[t]here [was] no evidence to support a claim that persons who have
suffered no criminal convictions but have been arrested on a number of occasions
can be expected, when employed, to perform less efficiently or less honestly than
other employees.” Id. Considering nationwide arrest statistics, “Negroes are arrested
substantially more frequently than whites in proportion to their numbers.” Id. at
403. Thus, “the possible use of [arrest] information as an illegally discriminatory
basis for rejection is so great and so likely, that, in order to effectuate the policies of
the Civil Rights Act, [the employer] should be restrained from obtaining such
information.” Id.
51
See generally Susan Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact
Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 292–94 (2011) (discussing the pre-Griggs disparate
impact cases).
52
See supra note 50.
47
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When Griggs reached the Supreme Court, disparate impact
53
doctrine was relatively well established in the lower courts.
Therefore, when the Court held in Griggs that “Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
54
simply the motivation,” it was not giving birth to a new theory.
Rather, it was following a progression, and in doing so, it held that
Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discriminatory
in effect, unless the employer meets “the burden of showing that any
given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the
55
employment in question.”
The Court did not have occasion in
Griggs to consider the likely reach of this theory. It simply set the
standard for later courts to apply.
The Griggs Court held that neutral policies with discriminatory
effects must be “related to job performance” and that the
56
“touchstone is business necessity.” But without a statutory text to
apply, the definition of that phrase evolved in later decisions. In
57
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court held that tests with adverse
impact are impermissible “unless shown, by professionally acceptable
methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with
important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant
58
to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.” Then
59
in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court stated that a discriminatory
employment practice is permissible only if it is “necessary to safe and
60
efficient job performance . . . . .” The appropriate standard seemed
to vary with the facts of individual cases.
B. The Narrowing of Disparate Impact Theory
61

In 1979, in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, the Court
limited the disparate impact theory due to its considerations of
employer exigency. Its decision in Beazer may foreshadow its
treatment of background checks that can reveal prior criminal
62
At issue in Beazer was the Transit Authority’s general
behavior.
53

See Selmi, supra note 47, at 717 (“At the time it arose, the Griggs case fit easily
within the developing case law.”).
54
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (emphasis in original).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 431.
57
422 U.S. 405 (1975).
58
Id. at 431.
59
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
60
Id. at 331 n.14.
61
440 U.S. 568 (1979).
62
See Linda Lye, Comment, Title VII’s Tangled Tale: The Erosion and Confusion of
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policy against employing people who were currently using narcotic
63
drugs, including methadone. Even though only twenty-five percent
of the Transit Authority’s employees were in positions that involved a
risk of danger to themselves or to the public, the Court held without
extensive analysis that the narcotics rule and its application to
64
methadone users was “job related” for all employees.
The
employer’s concerns about safety and efficiency were legitimate
65
concerns, which justified the exclusion of drug users. The Court
considered this policy to be sufficiently job related and necessary
where it “bears a ‘manifest relationship to the employment in
66
question.’”
Over the next few years, as the composition of the Supreme
Court changed, it narrowed disparate impact theory even further.
67
Ultimately, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court
significantly increased the burden for plaintiffs to meet the
68
applicable prima facie standard.
Wards Cove held that disparate
impact plaintiffs must: (1) prove their claims with statistics tailored to
69
the relevant labor market; (2) identify a specific employment
70
71
practice alleged to cause the disparity; and (3) prove causation.
The Court also added to the evolving “business necessity”
jurisprudence. Necessity involves a determination of whether the
practice at issue “serves, in a significant way, the legitimate
72
employment goals of the employer.”
More important, as far as
Congress was later concerned, the Court held that the burden of
persuasion was on the plaintiff to show that a given policy was not
73
justified by business necessity. By 1989, however, the Court had
come to approve a selection standard that significantly serves a
74
“legitimate employment goal[] . . . .”
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315,
327–29 (1998) (discussing the Court’s treatment of the disparate impact theory in
Beazer as confusing and erosive) .
63
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 571–72.
64
Id. at 587 n.31.
65
Id.
66
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
67
490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
68
Lye, supra note 62, at 332.
69
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650–51.
70
Id. at 657.
71
Id. at 656.
72
Id. at 659–60.
73
Id. at 660.
74
Id. at 659.
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C. Congressional Reaction
Wards Cove prompted Senator Edward Kennedy to introduce an
amendment to Title VII in 1990 in order “to restore and strengthen
75
civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment.” President
76
But the next year,
George H.W. Bush vetoed that measure.
President Bush’s appointment of former EEOC Chairman Clarence
Thomas to the Supreme Court resulted in an unseemly confirmation
77
battle.
In the aftermath of that fight and perhaps to address
concerns that arose in that context, Congress passed, and the
78
President signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The 1991 Act
79
In codifying the
included a legislative override of Wards Cove.
“business necessity” standard, Congress clearly put the burden of
80
persuasion on the employer to prove that a practice is job related.
After significant debate over the language of “business necessity” as it
had evolved through Wards Cove, Congress took the unusual step of
expressly depriving the courts of any legislative history that might
81
inform later decisions.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clearly overrode certain features of
82
Wards Cove. It did not, however, address the Court’s requirement
that plaintiffs prove that an employer’s policy has a discriminatory
impact in a relevant labor market: “[O]ne should compare the racial
composition . . . to the relevant labor market, rather than to the
83
[general] population.” The demographics of the fifty states are not
75

S. 2104, 101st Cong. (1990).
Steven A. Holmes, President Vetoes Bill on Job Rights; Showdown Is Set, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1990, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/23/us/presidentvetoes-bill-on-job-rights-showdown-is-set.html.
77
Adam Clymer, The Thomas Nomination, Conflict Emerges Over a 2D Witness, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/11/us/thethomas-nomination-conflict-emerges-over-a-2d-witness.html.
78
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)).
79
Civil Rights Act of 1991 at § 3; see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44
(2003).
80
§ 2000e-2(k).
81
See Civil Rights Act of 1991 at § 105(b) (“No statements other than the
interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S. 15276
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in
any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that
related to Wards Cove. . . .”).
82
Civil Rights Act of 1991 at § 3.
83
Hopkins v. Canton City Bd. of Educ., 477 Fed. Appx. 349, 358 (6th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis in original); see also NAACP v. N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d
464, 477 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In showing statistical disparity, the relevant comparison is
‘between the racial composition of [the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of
the qualified . . . population in the relevant labor market.’”) (quoting Newark
76

CONNOR & WHITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2012 EEOC GUIDANCE CRITIQUE

6/7/2013 10:08 AM

983

uniform, and not all employment positions involve recruiting from a
nationwide pool. For example, considering that in 2011, 26.0% of
Hawaiians were white, 2.0% black, and 38.5% Asian, a Hawaiian
employer should not be measured against nationwide statistics, where
in the same year 78.1% of Americans were white, 13.1% black, and
84
Nationwide statistics are not a relevant measure of
5.0% Asian.
impact unless the employer hires from a national pool. As applied to
criminal background checks, these variations—and the absence of
congressional agreement on what the phrase “job related and
consistent with business necessity” means—are significant.
Since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts have
adopted varying standards in an attempt to define “job related” and
“consistent with business necessity.” The following is a sample of
some of the definitions adopted: (1) the “hiring criteria must
effectively measure the ‘minimum qualifications for successful
performances of the job in question,’” but the “hiring policies need
85
not be perfectly tailored to be consistent with business necessity”;
(2) “the requirement [must have] a manifest relationship to the
employment in question, and [be] necessary to safe and efficient job
86
performance”; and (3) “the practice or action is necessary to
meeting a goal that, as a matter of law, qualifies as an important
87
business goal for Title VII purposes.”
The various efforts to arrive at definitions for “job related” and
“consistent with business necessity” illustrate that these terms are not
self-defining. As of the date of this Article, however, the Supreme
Court has denied certiorari in two cases that could have answered
88
these questions, ensuring that lower courts will continue to struggle
to define the ambiguous phrase until the high Court perceives the
need to step in.
Branch, NAACP v. City of Bayonne, 134 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1998)); Lopez v. Pac.
Mar. Ass’n, 657 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiff must have produced
evidence from which a fact-finder reasonably could conclude that the one-strike rule
results in fewer recovered drug addicts in Defendant’s employ, as compared to the
number of qualified recovered drug addicts in the relevant labor market.”).
84
State & County QuickFacts: Hawaii, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/15000.html.
85
El v. S. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Lanning
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 488 (3d Cir. 1999)).
86
Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1471 (8th Cir. 1996).
87
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993).
88
City of New Haven v. Briscoe, 654 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S.Ct. 2741 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1024); N. Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue v.
NAACP, 665 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2749 (U.S. June 11, 2012).
(No. 11-1247).
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D. The Consideration of Criminal Records
Over the past few decades, several courts have confronted the
issue of whether the consideration of arrest and conviction records in
employment decisions is a disparate impact violation of Title VII, but
only two appellate courts have engaged in such analysis. One of the
89
leading cases is a 1975 case, Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., in
which the Eighth Circuit questioned the “necessity” of an employer’s
absolute policy of refusing to employ any person convicted of a crime
90
other than a minor traffic offense in any position. Green involved
the rejection of an African American Vietnam War resister for a
91
In Green, the court held that a “sweeping
clerical job.
disqualification for employment resting solely on past behavior can
violate Title VII where that employment practice has a
disproportionate racial impact and rests upon a tenuous or
92
insubstantial basis.”
Under Green, to meet the requirements of
business necessity as the Eighth Circuit understood it in 1977, an
employment policy must not only foster safety and efficiency, but also
be essential to that goal, and there must be no acceptable alternative
that would accomplish that goal equally well with a lesser racial
93
impact.
The employer in Green offered a number of reasons why its
policy was consistent with business necessity, including: (1) fear of
cargo theft, (2) concern over handling company funds, (3) bonding
qualifications, (4) possible impeachment of the employee as a witness
in proceedings where the company was a party, (5) possible liability
for hiring persons with known violent tendencies, (6) employment
disruption caused by recidivism, and (7) alleged lack of moral
94
character of persons with convictions. The court, however, rejected
the employer’s reasons because it had not empirically validated the
95
policy or considered less draconian alternatives. The employer’s
reasons may have served as legitimate considerations in making
96
individual hiring decisions, but they did not justify an absolute ban.
Green announced a three-factor test to determine whether a
criminal conviction exclusion policy meets the business necessity
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1292–93.
Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1299.
Id. at 1298.
Green, 523 F.2d at 1298.
Id. at 1298.
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97

test.
The court developed this test adopting language from a
98
On Equal
Southern District of Iowa decision, Butts v. Nichols.
Protection grounds, Butts rejected an Iowa statute that prohibited the
99
employment of convicted felons in Iowa civil service positions. In
Butts, the district court invalidated the state statute because “no
consideration [was] given to the nature and seriousness of the crime
in relation to the job sought[;] [t]he time elapsing since the
conviction[;] the degree of the felon’s rehabilitation[;] and the
100
From this
circumstances under which the crime was committed.”
language, the Eighth Circuit developed the three “Green factors,”
which purport to correlate to the applicant’s “risk of recidivism” to
101
whether that risk warrants denying a job to a minority convict.
These three factors are discussed in detail in Part II, infra, as the
EEOC relied on them in drafting its 2012 Guidance.
After Green, the EEOC took the position that, for an employer to
establish a business necessity justifying the exclusion of an individual
from employment because of a conviction record, the employer must
show that the offense for which the applicant or employee was
102
convicted was job related. If the offense was not job related and the
standard excluded more African Americans than Caucasians, then
the employer could not consider it in employment decisions without
103
violating Title VII.
Even if the offense was determined to be job
related, however, the employer must have examined other relevant
factors to determine whether the conviction affected the individual’s
ability to perform the job in a manner consistent with the safe and
104
efficient operation of the employer’s business. These factors were:
(1) the number of offenses and the circumstances of each offense for
which the individual was convicted; (2) the length of time
intervening between the conviction and the employment decision;
(3) the individual’s employment history; and (4) the individual’s
105
efforts at rehabilitation. These factors presumably were thought to
106
correlate with the risk that the individual would recidivate.
97

Id. at 1297.
381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974); see also Green, 523 F.2d at 1297 (citing Butts,
381 F. Supp. at 580–81).
99
Id. at 69.
100
Butts, 381 F. Supp. at 580–81.
101
Cf. EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.b.
102
EEOC, COMMISSION DECISION NO. 78-35, CCH EEOC DECISIONS ¶ 6720 (1983).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
98
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In 1987, the EEOC incorporated the Green factors into the policy
guidance it sent to its district offices, an interpretation that might
receive deference from the courts under Supreme Court precedent
requiring courts to accept an agency’s statutory interpretation when
the agency’s interpretation is promulgated in the exercise of
authority delegated by Congress, so long as the interpretation is
107
reasonable.
Thus, in its February 4, 1987 Policy Statement on the
Issue of Conviction Records Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the EEOC stated that a Title VII plaintiff must show that a given
employment policy had an adverse impact on the protected class to
which the plaintiff belongs. The employer then must show that it
“considered” the three Green factors—”(1) [t]he nature and gravity of
the offense or offenses; (2) [t]he time that has passed since the
conviction and/or completion of the sentence; and (3) [t]he nature
108
of the job held or sought”—when it made its decision.
When disparate impact criminal records cases reached the
district courts in the 1980s, the courts accepted employer
justifications. Typical was the decision in Moses v. Browning-Feris
109
Industries of Kansas City, Inc.
Citing Beazer for support, the District
Court for the District of Kansas held that use of an applicant’s
criminal past in determining qualifications for a position as a waste
110
disposal worker is “justified by business necessity.” The court noted
that waste disposal workers “come in close contact with the public
many times during the day” and that they “occasionally have to enter
111
a person’s yard or even the front porch in order to pick up refuse.”
Thus, the defendant-employer’s policy was a business necessity.
112
Similarly, in EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.,
the
Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of the defendant-employer,
stating, “Can an employer refuse to hire persons convicted of a felony
even though it has a disparate impact on minority members? This
113
court’s answer is a firm ‘Yes’.” The court even jabbed at the authors
of Green: “With all due respect to the members of the Eighth Circuit,

107

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984).
108
EEOC, POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER TITLE
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, AS AMENDED, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1982),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html.
109
No. 84-2334-S, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20073 (D. Kan. Sept. 22, 1986).
110
Id. at *8–9.
111
Id. at *9.
112
723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
113
Id. at 753.
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114

their holding is ill founded.”
District Judge Gonzales noted that
“the honesty of a prospective employee is certainly a vital
consideration in the hiring decision” and that “[i]f Hispanics do not
wish to be discriminated against because they have been convicted of
115
theft then, they should stop stealing.” The court went so far as to
say that “[t]o hold otherwise is to stigmatize minorities by saying, in
116
effect, your group is not as honest as other groups.”
Additionally,
the court, citing Wards Cove, criticized the EEOC for relying on
nationwide statistics and for not “focus[ing] on the national origin
composition of the jobs at issue and the national origin composition
117
of the relevant labor market.”
Even in the years after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the courts
remain reluctant to sustain disparate impact challenges to the
consideration of criminal convictions in employment decisions. In
118
2007, in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the
Third Circuit upheld an employer’s decision under a policy not to
hire anyone who has a record of any felony or misdemeanor
119
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude or violence. The
defendant-employer had fired the plaintiff after learning of his forty120
The court
seven-year-old conviction for second-degree murder.
held that the employer’s policy was job related and consistent with
business necessity, although it did so on what it acknowledged was an
121
incomplete presentation in the district court.
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit mentioned the Green
122
factors as they appear in the EEOC’s 1987 Policy Statement.
The
court, however, held that “the EEOC’s Guidelines are [not] entitled
123
to great deference” and are “entitled only to Skidmore deference.”
114

Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
118
479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
119
Id. at 235.
120
Id. at 235–36.
121
Id. at 249. The Third Circuit pointedly made its decision on a scant record
supporting summary judgment for SEPTA. Id. at 246–47. It observed that plaintiff
had not presented evidence that might have led to a different result. Id. at 247.
122
479 F.3d at 243 (explaining that under the Skidmore standard, an agency is
entitled to “deference in accordance with the thoroughness of its research and the
persuasiveness of its reasoning”).
123
Id. at 244 (explaining that because the EEOC’s policy document did not
substantively analyze Title VII, it was not entitled to great deference) (citing EEOC v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)). Where an agency’s statutory
interpretation does not carry the force of law, courts do not afford Chevron-style
deference (i.e., deference to the interpretation so long as it is reasonable). See
115
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Thus, “the EEOC gets deference in accordance with the
thoroughness of its research and the persuasiveness of its
124
Because the EEOC’s 1987 Policy Statement “does not
reasoning.”
125
substantively analyze the statute,” the court treated it dismissively.
Despite recognizing that the Green factors are part of the EEOC’s
1987 Policy Statement, the Third Circuit did not evaluate the
126
employer’s policy against the three Green factors.
In 2007, the
ambiguous “business necessity” language from the 1991 amendments
to Title VII applied, and the Third Circuit focused on whether the
employer’s policy met the 1991 standard, which the court articulated
as follows: “employers [must] show that a discriminatory hiring policy
accurately—but not perfectly—ascertains an applicant’s ability to
127
perform successfully the job in question.”
Thus, to pass muster, a
policy must attempt to distinguish between applicants who pose an
128
unacceptable level of risk and those who do not.
The post-El courts have consistently ruled in favor of employers
129
on these claims.
Most employers have made their background
check policies more nuanced than Missouri Pacific Railroad
130
Company’s policy at issue in Green. Perhaps because committing a
crime, unlike failing a test, seems like an act for which a person
should be held responsible and perhaps because of the prospect of
putting courts in the position of requiring employers to assume risks
that they are in the best position to judge, the federal courts generally

Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–83 (1984);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
124
El, 479 F.3d at 243.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 244.
127
Id. at 242.
128
Id. at 245.
129
See, e.g., Foxworth v. Pa. State Police, 228 F. App’x 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2007);
Naugles v. Dollar Gen., Inc., No. 4:08-CV-01943, 2010 WL 1254645, at *5 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 24, 2010); Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537
F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 2008); Clinkscale v. City of Phila., No. Civ. A. 972165, 1998 WL 372138, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1998); Williams v. Carson Pirie Scott,
No. 92 C 5747, 1992 WL 229849, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992). But see Field v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., No. Civ. A. 00-5913, 2001 WL 34368768, at *1–3 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
30, 2001) (granting the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to provide more
evidence regarding whether the employer’s blanket policy against hiring persons
with recent criminal records violated Title VII, but not deciding whether the plaintiff
would succeed on the merits of her claim).
130
See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 549
F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (MoPac) follows
an absolute policy of refusing consideration for employment to any person convicted
of a crime other than a minor traffic offense.”).
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have been reluctant to interfere with such employment policies.
132
For instance, in Naugles v. Dollar General, Inc., the Eastern
District of Missouri held in favor of Dollar General against a Title VII
plaintiff. The court noted that:
Dollar General is a retailer whose employees handle
merchandise and large amounts of cash. Its employees also
may be in a store alone with customers or with another
employee. Dollar General therefore has a consistentlyapplied and non-discriminatory policy of only employing
people that either have no criminal history, or whose
criminal history is not related by its nature to tasks
performed by Dollar General employees, or is sufficiently
133
remote in time as not to be job-related.
Pursuant to this neutral policy, Dollar General had rescinded its offer
of employment to the plaintiff after a criminal background check
revealed the plaintiff’s “numerous convictions for violent crimes,
such as armed robbery and armed criminal action, and his recent
134
release from incarceration.” The court granted summary judgment
to the defendant on the issue, noting also that twelve of the store’s
135
fourteen employees were African American.
Similarly, in Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw &
136
Eisenbrandt, LLP, the Western District of Missouri granted summary
judgment to the defendant, a law firm that had discharged an
137
employee after discovering his thirty-year-old rape conviction. The
court first criticized the plaintiff for relying upon general, all-felony
statistics to prove disparate impact based on race, rather than
138
statistics for sex offenders more specifically. It then held that: “Sad
as it may be for plaintiff, his extraordinary criminal conduct almost
131

See, e.g., Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir.
2010) (“We do not sit as a ‘super-personnel department,’ and it is not our role to
second-guess the wisdom of an employer’s business decisions—indeed the wisdom of
them is irrelevant—as long as those decisions were not made with a discriminatory
motive. That is true no matter how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how highhanded its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers.”)
(quotations and citations omitted); Johnson v. Weld County, 594 F.3d 1202, 1211
(10th Cir. 2010) (“Title VII licenses us not to act as a ‘super personnel department’
to undo bad employment decisions; instead, it charges us to serve as a vital means for
redressing discriminatory ones.”).
132
No. 4:08-CV-01943, 2010 WL 1254645 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 24, 2010).
133
Id. at *2–3.
134
Id.
135
Id. at *5.
136
537 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (W.D. Mo. 2008).
137
Id. at 1030.
138
Id.

CONNOR & WHITE (DO NOT DELETE)

6/7/2013 10:08 AM

990

[Vol. 43:971

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

thirty years ago will likely reduce his opportunities as a prospective
employee during his employable life. Race and sex discrimination
laws do not impose duties on employers to overlook significant
139
potential dangers, at least to employee morale.” Thus, the plaintiff
in Berkowitz Oliver—like the plaintiff in every case since Green—lost his
disparate impact case. With only two appellate cases on the issue, the
current judicial approach is to find that “job related and consistent
with business necessity” is a standard that allows employers significant
leeway when it comes to evaluating risk from prior criminal
misconduct.
IV. THE NEW EEOC GUIDANCE
Following cases like Berkowitz Oliver and Dollar General, and after
the Third Circuit’s rejection of the EEOC’s 1987 Policy Statement in
El, the EEOC issued a new guidance on criminal conviction exclusion
140
policies in 2012.
EEOC released those policies April 25, 2012,
entitled Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“the
141
2012 Guidance”).
The 2012 Guidance considers nationwide
conviction and incarceration rates to justify its broad hypothesis of
adverse impact, while paying little attention to the relevance of labor
142
markets and local crime rates. This Guidance then focuses on the
employer’s burden to defend and provides that employers will
“consistently” satisfy the “job related and consistent with business
necessity” defense when it satisfies the following requirements:
[1] [t]he employer validates the criminal conduct screen
for the position in question per the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures (Uniform Guidelines)
standards . . . or [2A] [t]he employer develops a targeted
screen considering at least . . . the three Green factors[], and
then [2B] provides an opportunity for an individualized
assessment for people excluded by the screen to determine
whether the policy as applied is job related and consistent
143
with business necessity.
139

Id. at 1031. In other contexts, employee morale or customer preferences have
been widely rejected as a basis for a business necessity or bona fide occupational
qualification under Title VII. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d
385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
140
See generally EEOC, supra note 3.
141
Id.
142
EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.A.2.
143
Id. at V.B.4; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (describing the general standards for
validity studies).
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Even then, the policy may violate Title VII if the employer could have
144
adopted an alternative policy with a lesser discriminatory impact.
These four parts of the EEOC Guidance are described in turn below.
A. Validity Studies
According to the new EEOC Guidance, employers “may rely
upon criterion-related validity studies, content validity studies or
145
construct validity studies.”
These three types of studies are well
defined in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
146
Procedures adopted in 1978. First, a criterion-related validity study
consists of “empirical data demonstrating that the selection
procedure is predictive of or significantly correlated with important
147
elements of job performance.”
Second, a content validity study
consists of “data showing that the content of the selection procedure
is representative of important aspects of performance on the job for
148
which the candidates are to be evaluated.”
Third, a construct
validity study consists of “data showing that the procedure measures
the degree to which candidates have identifiable characteristics which
have been determined to be important in successful performance in
149
the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.”
The Uniform Guidelines describe the technical standards for
150
these validity studies in detail; however, the standards for validity
studies set an unrealistically high bar for justifying a rejection based
on criminal convictions. This approach would require identification
of a specific standard that causes impact and, if that hurdle is
overcome, a demonstration of the job relatedness of that standard to
151
It is, of course, not “essential” to the job of
a particular job.
delivering furniture that an applicant not have a conviction for
violent crimes, and if imposed, the standard is not susceptible to the
same scientific validity analysis as, for example, a pencil and paper
test.
The EEOC acknowledges as much: “Although there may be
social science studies that assess whether convictions are linked to

144

Id. at V.C.
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(A) (2011).
146
§ 1607.
147
§ 1607.5(B).
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
§ 1607.14.
151
Id.
145
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future behaviors, traits, or conduct with workplace ramifications, and
thereby provide a framework for validating some employment
152
exclusions, such studies are rare at the time of this drafting.”
Validating the absence of a felony conviction—or the absence of
indications of dishonesty or possible violence—against a set of job
elements may be impossible. But honesty and the absence of
indications of a proclivity to violence are central to any employer’s
153
legitimate business interests.
B. The Green Factors
In the absence of a validity study, the Guidance would evaluate
whether an employer has applied the three Green factors and then
154
allowed for an individualized assessment.
The three Green factors
strive to determine whether an applicant’s “risk of recidivism”
warrants denying that individual a job if he or she is a convicted
155
offender.
The first Green factor is “the nature and gravity of the offense” or
156
conduct.
This factor correlates with Butts’ consideration of the
157
“nature and seriousness of the crime in relation to the job sought.”
158
The focus of this first factor is on “the harm caused by the crime.”
In weighing this factor, an employer may consider the legal elements
159
of the crime.
In general, the EEOC treats misdemeanors as less
160
important than felonies.
The second Green factor is “the time that has passed since the
161
conviction and/or completion of the sentence.”
This factor
correlates to Butts’ consideration of “[t]he time elapsing since the
162
conviction.”
Green provides no guidance as to how much time
matters. Similarly, the EEOC Guidance states that determining
152

EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.5.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (“[T]he honesty of a prospective employee is certainly a vital
consideration in the hiring decision.”). See also cases cited supra note 27.
154
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. at 753.
155
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.b
(“Relevant and available information to make this assessment includes, for example,
studies demonstrating how much the risk of recidivism declines over a specified
time.”).
156
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 580–81 (S.D. Ia. 1974).
158
EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.a.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Green, 549 F.2d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162
Butts, 381 F. Supp. at 580–81.
153
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where to draw the line is a difficult decision that must “depend on
163
It counsels
the particular facts and circumstances of each case.”
that an employer should research studies demonstrating “how much
164
the risk of recidivism declines over a specified time.” Such studies
have shown that a staggering 67.5% of former prisoners are rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three years of
165
their release from prison.
Others report different results with
respect to an offender’s future criminal misconduct when compared
to the general population. But the rough (albeit debatable)
consensus is that, in the absence of further arrests, the risk of
recidivism becomes insignificant somewhere between seven and ten
166
years after a first offense. Determining the risk that a given person
will commit another crime is a challenging task. Many laws require
167
the effort, however, and the Department of Justice has even
mandated that one company refuse to hire any applicant with a
“felony, theft, or larceny conviction within the applicant’s lifetime which
168
resulted in an active prison or jail sentence” as part of a settlement.
169
The third Green factor is “the nature of the job” held or sought.
163

EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.b.
Id.
165
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002).
166
See Bushway, Nieuwbeerta & Blokland supra note 2, at 33 (“Offenders do
eventually look like non-offenders, usually after a spell of between 7 and 10 years of
nonoffending.”); see also “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal Background
Checks, supra note 2, at 13 (reporting that, after 7.7 years, a person arrested at 18 for
robbery, who has no further arrests, is no less likely to commit another crime than
someone in the general population). These studies measure recidivism by
subsequent arrests (not convictions), an issue that may call into questions consistency
with other positions the EEOC takes on arrests as a standard. Id. at 14.
167
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1829 (2013) (restricting persons convicted of any
criminal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust or money laundering from
owning, controlling, or participating in the conduct of the affairs of an FDIC insured
institution); 42 U.S.C. § 13041 (2006) (“Each agency of the Federal Government,
and every facility operated by the Federal Government (or operated under contract
with the Federal Government), that hires (or contracts for hire) individuals involved
with the provision to children under the age of 18 of child care services shall assure
that all existing and newly hired employees undergo a criminal history background
check.”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-90.2 (2012) (requiring criminal history checks for
child care providers); 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1-111 (2012) (“Administrators of public and
private schools, intermediate units and area vocational-technical schools shall require
prospective employees to submit with their employment application . . . a report of
criminal history record information from the Pennsylvania State Police or a
statement from the Pennsylvania State Police that the State Police central repository
contains no such information relating to that person.”).
168
EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Fla.
1989) (emphasis added).
169
Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977) (internal
164
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This factor, like the first factor, correlates to Butts’ consideration
about the “nature and seriousness of the crime in relation to the job
170
An inquiry into the nature of the job encompasses the
sought.”
job’s title, its duties, its essential functions, the physical environment
in which the job is performed, and the circumstances under which it
is performed, including the level of supervision, oversight, and
171
interaction with co-workers or vulnerable individuals.
This factor
helps link “the criminal conduct to the essential functions of the
position . . . [to] assist an employer in demonstrating that its policy or
172
practice is job related and consistent with business necessity.”
None of the three Green factors appear in Title VII, which is
unsurprising because they are derived from an Equal Protection case
and because it was not the focus of Congress when it passed or
amended Title VII to create protection for voluntary conduct that
173
results in a conviction for a crime. The Supreme Court has never
had occasion to approve the Green factors, and in 2007, the Third
174
Moreover,
Circuit did not apply the Green factors in deciding El.
these factors protect only Blacks, Hispanics, and other minority
groups that have been discriminated against in the past. A white
person would not have been able to present a prima facie case based
175
on the facts of Green.
C. The Individualized Assessment
The 2012 Guidance would require an employer to first consider
the three Green factors and then to conduct an individualized
assessment for the African American or Hispanic candidate. To
conduct an individualized assessment, an employer must: (1)
“inform[] the individual that he may be excluded because of past
criminal conduct,” (2) “provide[] an opportunity to the individual to
demonstrate that the exclusion does not properly apply to him,” and
(3) “consider[] whether the individual’s additional information
shows that the policy as applied is not job related and consistent with

quotation marks omitted).
170
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 580–81 (S.D. Ia. 1974).
171
EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.6.c.
172
Id.
173
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
174
El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2007).
175
This may prove troublesome over time as the Supreme Court ultimately takes
up this issue.
At least one justice has expressed reservations about the
constitutionality of the disparate impact theory overall. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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176

business necessity.”
The individualized assessment may include
information regarding his misidentification, mitigating facts or
circumstances, his age at the time of the conviction, the number of
offenses, evidence of rehabilitation, his employment history,
177
references, and bond status.
D. Less Discriminatory Alternative
Even if an employer demonstrates that its policy is job related
and consistent with business necessity, whether by a validity study or a
consideration of the Green factors coupled with an individualized
assessment, the Guidance holds that the EEOC may still find
reasonable cause to believe a Title VII violation has occurred if it
believes that there was a less discriminatory alternative employment
practice, which the employer did not adopt but which serves the
178
employer’s legitimate goals as effectively as the challenged practice.
Factors such as the cost or burdens of a proposed alternative are
relevant in determining whether the alternative would be “equally as
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s
179
legitimate business goals.”
V. THE FLAWS OF THE 2012 GUIDANCE
Title VII declares that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
180
origin.”
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified disparate impact
theory, allowing a claim under Title VII when the plaintiff
“demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
181
position in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”
Thus, to state a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must prove that an
employer’s practice truly causes a disparate impact based on one of
the five protected immutable characteristics of an applicant, as
176
177
178
179
180
181

EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.9.
Id.
Id. at V.C.
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
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measured against the appropriate work force population.

182

A. The 2012 Guidance Is Based on Flawed Statistics
The new EEOC Guidance represents an effort to advance a
nationwide policy for something that is inherently local. Disparate
impact plaintiffs must show that a specific practice produces a
183
disparate impact in the “relevant labor market.”
Even though
nationwide statistics may indicate that an employer’s policy has a
discriminatory impact, a plaintiff cannot succeed without statistics
184
tailored to the relevant market. Thus, proof that African Americans
in the nation have criminal records at a higher rate overall does not,
in itself, show that a criminal record exclusion policy has a disparate
impact on African Americans in Omaha, for example.
The EEOC justifies its 2012 Guidance by citing nationwide
statistics—namely that arrest and incarceration rates across the nation
are generally much higher for African American men (one in three)
and Hispanic men (one in six) than for White men (one in
185
seventeen). Yet such statistics vary from state to state and, perhaps
more significantly, from crime to crime.
1. Variations Based on State
After accounting for population, the Black-to-White ratio rate of
incarceration per 100,000 people ranges from a high of 19.0 to 1.0 in
186
the District of Columbia to a low of 1.9 to 1.0 in Hawaii. Along with
the District of Columbia, four states have a ratio at or above 12.0 to
187
188
1.0. In contrast, five states have a ratio at or below 4.0 to 1.0. No
state has a ratio in which Blacks fare better than Whites, although
189
data from New Mexico and Wyoming are unavailable.
For
Hispanics, however, the incarceration rates vary even more
substantially. After accounting for population, the Hispanic-to-White
ratio rate of incarceration per 100,000 people ranges from a high of
182

Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650–51.
See cases cited supra note 83.
184
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i)(1)(A)(i) (2006); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 650–51 (1989).
185
EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5.
186
Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration by Race
and Ethnicity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, at 11, tbl. 6 (2007). The statistics illustrate
regional disparities. Id. at 7. While the national black-to-white ratio of incarceration
is 5.6, it varies greatly among the states. Id. at 10.
187
Those states are Iowa, Vermont, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Id.
188
Those states are Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and Hawaii. Id.
189
Id.
183
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6.6 to 1.0 in Connecticut to a low of 0.4 to 1.0 in Hawaii.
Only
191
In nine states,
three states have a ratio at or above 5.0 to 1.0.
Hispanics are actually less likely to be incarcerated than Whites are,
192
even after accounting for the size difference in population.
An
additional eleven states have a ratio between 1.3 to 1.0 and 1.1 to 1.0,
making Hispanics only slightly more likely to be incarcerated than
193
194
Whites are. Data from eleven states are unavailable. Significantly,
these statistics do not account for differences by crime type.
After generalizing from national statistics, however, the 2012
Guidance instructs district directors to find a violation of Title VII
when an employment policy excludes a minority applicant, triggering
an automatic shift in the burden to the employer to prove job
195
relatedness and consistency with business necessity. This cannot be
the law. A Hawaiian Hispanic should not be able to bring a disparate
impact claim against a Hawaiian employer for the consideration of
conviction records because in Hawaii, Hispanics are not adversely
affected by such employment policies. Whites are actually more likely
196
to have been incarcerated than Hispanics in Hawaii.
Similarly,
while Blacks in every state are more likely than Whites to be
incarcerated, there may very well be certain counties in which Blacks
fare better than Whites, as Hispanics fare better than Whites in
certain states.
2. Variations Based on Crime
Even allowing for the limited purposes of the Guidance, its focus
on generalized statistics of incarceration takes inadequate notice of
the likelihood that employers’ decisions do not range so broadly. As
the district judge found in Fletcher, the relevant inquiry is whether a
decision was based on a specific criminal history that required a
specific risk decision by the employer, not a probe into the general
197
statistical presence of crime in society at large. It may be that, if the
plaintiff in that case had been convicted of a different crime not
190

Mauer & King, supra note 186, at 14, tbl. 8.
Those states are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Id.
192
Those states are Nevada, Michigan, Georgia, Alaska, Florida, Arkansas, West
Virginia, Louisiana, and Hawaii. Mauer & King, supra note 186, at 14, tbl. 8.
193
Those states are Kentucky, Washington, Indiana, Texas, Virginia, Mississippi,
Missouri, Tennessee, South Carolina, Oregon, and Oklahoma. Id.
194
Those states are Alabama, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico,
North Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
195
EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at V.B.
196
See Mauer & King, supra note 186 at tbl. 8.
197
Fletcher, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
191
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involving sexual assault, the employer would have regarded it as less
risky to employ him, or the court may have found that the decision
was not tailored appropriately to the firm’s “legitimate business
objectives.” That court, however, made clear that close scrutiny of
those statistics reveals more appropriate models for statistical analysis
than the general incarceration rates across the nation.
In sweeping all crime or incarceration statistics into every
employer’s decision-making, the 2012 Guidance does not consider
the fact that there are crimes that present specific risks and there are
crimes that may be more prevalent in one segment of society than in
others. For instance, nationwide, 45.3% of all Americans who
committed homicide from 1980 to 2008 were White, whereas 52.5%
198
were Black.
With respect to workplace-related homicides in that
same period, however, 70.8% of offenders were White, whereas
199
25.8% were Black. Even more skewed are the statistics showing that
White offenders committed 84% of homicides involving White
victims, while Black offenders committed 93% of homicides involving
200
Black victims.
Other crimes exhibit similarly significant differences. For
example, in 2006, far more stalking offenders were White than
201
Black. From 1993 to 2002, 21% of carjackers were White, whereas
202
In 2002, 64.9% of defendants
56% of carjackers were Black.
convicted of intellectual property theft were White, whereas 6.1%
203
were Black. From 1993 to 1999, Whites committed 54.7% of violent
victimizations in the workplace (defined as rape, sexual assault,
robbery, aggravated assault, and simple assault, but not homicide),
204
whereas Blacks committed 30.2%.
In 2010, 68.9% of larceny-theft
205
In 2010, 85.7%
offenders were White, whereas 28.3% were Black.
198

ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 236018,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, at 3, tbl. 1 (2011).
199
Id. at 12, tbl. 7.
200
Id. at 13.
201
See KATRINA BAUM, SHANNAN CATALANO & MICHAEL RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 224527, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at 12, app’x
tbl. 2 (2009) (providing the raw numbers necessary to calculate the rates). Stalking
is “primarily intraracial in nature.” Id. at 4.
202
PATSY KLAUS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 205123, CARJACKING, 1993–
2002, at 1 (2004).
203
MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 205800, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY THEFT, 2002, at 5, tbl. 3 (2004).
204
DETIS T. DUHART, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 190076, VIOLENCE IN THE
WORKPLACE, 1993–99, at 1, 7, tbl. 13 (2001).
205
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, TBL. 43A,
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-
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of driving while under the influence offenders were White, whereas
206
only 11.5% were Black. This kind of variance may be why the court
in Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver required that the plaintiff produce
statistics to show that Blacks are more likely to be sex offenders
207
specifically, rather than felons generally.
If a trucking company enacted a policy to refuse to hire any
trucker who has had a DUI conviction, then no racial minority should
be able to prove a disparate impact case against that employer
because the policy does not actually create a disparate impact, even
though the 2012 Guidance would presume a disparate impact from
its reference to general national statistics. Just as a plaintiff cannot
rely upon nationwide incarceration statistics, the plaintiff also cannot
rely upon general incarceration statistics.
B. Statistics Do Not Show the Full Story
Contrary to popular wisdom, data from a study by Professors
Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael Stoll show that employers
who do check backgrounds are significantly more likely to hire
minorities with convictions than those who do not check
208
backgrounds.
Because nationwide statistics show that, as a whole,
African Americans are more likely to be incarcerated than Whites,
this research might seem counterintuitive. But what it seems to
demonstrate is that background checks dispel what otherwise might
be automatic stereotypes. Examining a job applicant’s background
209
seems to avoid this stereotyping characterization.
Employers may believe that arrest and incarceration rates are
much higher for African American men than for other
demographics, and conducting a background check appears to
improve the prospect of hiring for Black males. Employers, however,
will not have perfect information about individual applicants and
employees. Employers care greatly about whether their employees
have criminal records because they need to trust their employees,
and they want to avoid harm to customers and other employees—
harm which a jury may find to have been foreseeable. Checking
backgrounds may override false assumptions that are especially likely

the-u.s.-2010/tables/table-43/10tbl43a.xls.
206
Id.
207
Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp.
2d 1028, 1030 (W.D. Mo. 2008).
208
Holzer, supra note 1, at 458.
209
Id. This study was not cited in the EEOC Guidance.
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210

if job applicants have unexplained gaps on their resumes. Thus, if
employers check to determine whether their applicants have criminal
211
records, they are more likely to hire African American applicants.
If screening for criminal convictions actually makes African
Americans more likely to be hired, the EEOC approach has extended
212
beyond its statutory mission to eliminate racial discrimination.
That mission is to end discrimination based on an “individual’s race,
213
Screening for criminal
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
convictions may actually advance that mission, and creating a new
theory of discrimination is a task for Congress, not an enforcement
agency.
It remains to be answered why the EEOC ignored the evidence
that these background checks advance its objectives. Either the
EEOC: (1) disputes the validity of these statistics; (2) is unaware of
these statistics; or (3) has given itself a new mission to help convicted
criminals find employment. Of these three possibilities, there is no
evidence that the first one is correct. Nowhere in the EEOC
Guidance does the EEOC discuss these statistics; instead, it assumes
that, because “African Americans and Hispanics are arrested at a rate
that is 2 to 3 times their proportion of the general population,”
screening for criminal convictions will have an adverse impact by
214
race.
This lends some credence to the second possibility: perhaps the
EEOC is simply unaware that African Americans are more likely to be
215
hired when employers consider conviction records. “[T]he EEOC
gets deference in accordance with the thoroughness of its research
and the persuasiveness of its reasoning,” however, and ignoring that
research may be fatal to any effort to persuade the courts to accept
216
this interpretation of Title VII.
If the EEOC is unaware of these
statistics, then the agency has not been as thorough with its research
as it should be.
Perhaps instead the third possibility is correct, and the EEOC
has embarked upon a new mission to help convicted criminals who
are African American or Hispanic to find employment. The EEOC
convened on July 26, 2011 “to Examine Arrest and Conviction
210
211
212
213
214
215
216

Id. at 458–59.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 451.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
See EEOC Enforcement Guidance No. 915.002, supra note 5, at II.
The 2012 Guidance does not cite to the Holzer, Raphael, Stoll article.
El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Records as a Hiring Barrier.” At this meeting, the commissioners
invited various speakers to testify and thus influence what would
become the 2012 Guidance. Professor Stephen Saltzburg testified
about the “hidden world of punishment” and the difficulty that
217
offenders have in finding employment.
Saltzburg lamented that
these offenders were trapped in a vicious cycle because a significant
218
predictor of recidivism is whether an ex-convict finds employment.
The EEOC also heard from the President and Chief Executive Officer
of D.C. Central Kitchen, who expressed his concern about the
economic aspect of employing people with a criminal history—the
cost of offenders returning to jail and the need to pay for jail
amenities, as well as the lost benefit to the economy of taxes and
219
wages from the employment of ex-offenders. The other speakers at
the meeting also spoke to the importance of reemploying ex-convicts
in general; they typically were not focused on the impact on racial
minorities of the consideration of criminal records.
The EEOC appears to be on a mission to reduce recidivism by
attacking the perceived barrier to employment it believes background
checks represent, but in doing so, it has ignored evidence that
employment after release does not seem to have an impact on
220
recidivism.
Employing former offenders may be a socially
important goal, but compelling employers to abandon their risk
management is neither within the EEOC’s statutory authority nor
apparently effective for the announced purpose of the initiative.
Title VII prohibits employers from adopting policies that have a
221
disparate impact by “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
222
“Criminal status” is not yet a protected class. Perhaps Congress will
enact greater protections for returning offenders—indeed, this is one
223
of President Obama’s stated goals —but it is not the EEOC’s
mission.

217

Stephen Saltzburg, Professor, George Washington Univ. Law School, Written
Testimony
for
EEOC
Meeting
(July
26,
2011),
available
at
http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-26-11/saltzburg.cfm.
218
Id.
219
Michael F. Curtin, Jr., President & CEO, D.C. Cent. Kitchen, Written
Testimony
for
EEOC
Meeting
(July
26,
2011),
available
at
http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-26-11/curtin.cfm.
220
It is also not at all clear that there is a connection between post release
employment and a reduction of recidivism. Marilyn Moses, Ex-Offender Job Placement
Programs Do Not Reduce Recidivism, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug./Sept. 2012, at 106–08.
221
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
222
See id.
223
Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 28, at 10.
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C. The Green Factors’ Imperfect Fit with the Risk of Recidivism
In adopting the three Green factors, the EEOC has acknowledged
concerns from employers that an applicant or employee will
224
recidivate and cause harm.
Unfortunately, predictions of
redemption and desistence are academic projections and are
uncertain reeds on which to lean in making practical risk decisions.
Some studies show that at some time between seven and ten years
after a first offense, a statistical offender who has not been arrested
again will present no greater risk of future criminal involvement than
225
does the general population.
These studies are based on limited
226
data. Obviously, an employer cannot predict with certainty whether
a given job applicant will later commit a crime against it or a
customer or fellow employee. It can only try to make an educated
evaluation on limited information.
These recidivism studies are problematic for the EEOC
Guidance because they show that the rate of recidivism is more
closely tied to factors other than merely the three Green factors, even
as enhanced by the 2012 Guidance. After all, resuming criminal
activity is an act of the will, and there are more factors that may
significantly predict recidivism than the EEOC has either considered
or mentioned in its Guidance.
The Florida Department of
Corrections commissioned a study released in July 2003 to identify
the factors that bore a significant relationship to recidivism in former
227
prisoners.
A partial list of factors that have been found to be
statistically significant for recidivism includes:
 race
 Hispanic ethnicity
 age at release from incarceration
 post-release supervision
 time spent in prison
 disciplinary reports in prison
 education level and

224

EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 5, at III.
See supra note 165.
226
For example, they generally measure indications of recidivism from later
arrests, not convictions, an issue on which EEOC and the courts may have further
concerns. See Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 28, at 14.
227
FLA. DEP’T OF CORRS., RESULTS: FACTORS AFFECTING RECIDIVISM RATES (2003),
available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/recidivism/2003/results.html; see also
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf.
225
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 prior recidivism
Among these, the Guidance would acknowledge only age and
prior conviction history as factors the employer might properly
consider in making an “individualized assessment” of the fitness of
the candidate. Risk assessment is a complicated and uncertain
process. It involves many interacting factors. But this list strongly
suggests that an employer who “treats” applicants similarly in making
these decisions regardless of race should not be held liable for the
“impact” of those decisions. No better case could be made for
confining claims of discrimination in the use of criminal background
checks to the disparate treatment theory of proof than the simple fact
that “race” is a statistically significant predictor of recidivism.
The list indicates that an African American or a Hispanic with a
prior conviction or someone who has had significant disciplinary
reports in prison, minimal education, and prior recidivism is
significantly more likely to make the decision to commit a crime
again, leading then to an analysis of whether African Americans or
Hispanics are disproportionately represented in any of these groups.
On this list, the EEOC recognizes only age at release as a significant
factor that should be considered in making a risk assessment. There
may be many reasons for these statistically significant associations.
But ultimately, anyone who decides to commit a crime is likely to
experience the stigma associated with that choice. That stigma may
be a disadvantage to him when compared to those who did not make
the same choice. It is also possible that those who make those
choices will present more often to potential employers as risky hires
than will those who have not made that election. In those cases, so
long at is that decision, and not race, that causes him disadvantage,
Title VII does not protect him.
This puts the problem of considering this employment practice
statistically against the pool of convicted offenders in the entire
United States in perspective. Criminal conduct is a product of choice
and is not an immutable characteristic of anyone’s race or ethnicity.
Therefore, it should not be measured as if it were like an agility test
or an educational qualification that can be validated. Free choices
made by individuals may have consequences, but as long as those
consequences apply similarly among protected groups, Title VII does
not reach them.

D. What is “Business Necessity”?
Even if the EEOC or private plaintiffs were successful in
developing a proper statistical case of adverse impact in these cases, it
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is not at all clear that the courts will require the level of proof the
2012 Guidance urges to establish “business necessity” as they have
defined it in this context.
There is nothing in the case law that would suggest a validation
under the Uniform Guidelines will be required to prove that failing
to hire someone convicted of theft has the criterion, content or
228
construct validity of a paper and pencil test for firefighters.
The
decision on this issue turns on the employer’s sense of risk to its
business or to its visitors, customers, and other employees. The
employer may make its determination based on risk to the employer,
such as the risk Judge Gonzales found present in Carolina Freight,
where, for example, “the honesty of a prospective employee [was]
229
certainly a vital consideration in the hiring decision.” In contrast to
all the processes the 2012 Guidance urges on employers seeking to
show the “business necessity” of their risk management decisions, the
courts have recognized that there are other legal obligations to be
discharged that may not lend themselves to precise analysis. The
courts’ decisions to date on this issue indicate that they are likely to
continue to defer to the good faith decisions of employers that
advance their legitimate business objectives, so long as the standard
applies equally among protected categories of applicants.
In any event, the Guidance does not take account of these
decisions in its analysis justifying the EEOC’s interpretation of the
law, and this is a weakness of the approach that may deny it favorable
230
judicial deference.
VI. CONCLUSION
The creative use of government power to remedy discrimination
against any group is one of the great accomplishments of the 20th
Century, and addressing problems in the judicial system that may
cause imbalance between the races is an appropriate matter for the
legislative and judicial branches today. But Congress has vested the
EEOC with specified powers to address particular forms of
discrimination under Title VII. As the enforcement agency, it is
entitled to the deference that comes with fair interpretations of the
law and appropriate analysis supporting those interpretations. The
2012 Guidance is not such a case. To the extent that the Commission
has ignored data and studies that do not comport with its extra228
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curricular purpose of addressing recidivism at large, it has taken on
the role assigned to Congress under the Constitution.

